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PROCEDURE-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION- STRICT LOCALITY
RULE REJECTED; MARITIME CONNECTION NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION. Smith v. Guerrant (S.D. Tex.

1968).
Mr. Smith's Hyster forklift was left unattended on a wharf
in the Galveston, Texas, yacht basin. It rolled off the wharf and
onto a finger pier or walkway. Defendant Guerrant Construction
Company was hired to use its crane to lift the forklift off the
walkway and place it back on the wharf. While doing so, the
crane's boom collapsed, causing the forklift to fall into the
waters of the harbor. Smith filed a libel in admiralty for water
damage, alleging that the tort was maritime because, under the
locality rule, it was consummated in waters within maritime
jurisdiction. Guerrant cross-complained in admiralty for the
damage done to its crane. Smith moved to dismiss Guerrant's
cross-complaint as not being within admiralty jurisdiction. Smith
argued that since the damage to the crane occurred prior to
touching the water, the tort did not take place within admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. The court, on its own motion,
questioned jurisdiction of the original complaint. Neither party
made any allegations of a maritime nature in their transaction.
Since Smith cited no specific jurisdictional statute, the court
assumed he relied upon article III, section 2 of the United States
Constitution' and Title 28 U.S.C. section 1333.2 Held:
Jurisdiction denied as to the claims of both parties; when
determining whether or not a claim is maritime in order to
sustain jurisdiction in admiralty, a maritime connection is
needed. A maritime connection is found when the tort claim is
wholly related to maritime service, navigation, or commerce
on navigable waters. Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. III
(S.D. Tex. 1968).
While deciding upon a maritime connection as a prerequisite
to establishing admiralty and maritime jurisdiction under section
1333, the United States District Court in Smith, for the first
time, rejected the strict locality jurisdiction rule.3 This rule states
that a court of admiralty may entertain a tort action if the
transaction occurred or was consummated on a navigable
I. Section 2 provides in part: "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ......
2. Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F. Supp. III, 112 n.6 (S.D. Tex. 1968); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1333 (1964).
3. 290 F. Supp. at 114.
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waterway or on the high seas While the locality rule is simple
to state, it is difficult to apply.
In deciding jurisdictional questions, many courts have paid
lip service to the strict locality rule but have based their holdings
on additional grounds. Courts have found that jurisdiction is
established where the tort in question had some sort of a
"maritime nature," such as a hatch cover falling on a ship, or, a
surfboard rider striking an ocean swimmer.5 Other courts have
added another requirement that if there is in existence, in
addition to locality, a maritime contract between the parties then
there is a sufficient relationship to justify maritime jurisdiction
under a "maritime contract" or "maritime status" theory.'
However, there are times when, under the facts presented
(libellant injured by protruding object in ocean, or libellant
injured by diving off a pier into 18 inches of water) some courts
will hold that a case is not within admiralty, or should not be
within admiralty, and jurisdiction has been denied. It is in this
4. In De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815), Judge
Story first stated:
[t]he delegation of cognizance of "all civil cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" to the courts of the United States comprehends all
maritime contracts, torts, and injuries. The latter branch is necessarily
bounded by locality ....
De Lovio contains an exhaustive historical and multi-national discussion of the roots of
maritime jurisdiction. See 25 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1912); 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF
AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 127 at 349-50 (6th ed. A. Knauth 1940). See also The
Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1865), where the Court denied admiralty jurisdiction
under a strict interpretation of locality. A steam vessel caught fire and the fire destroyed
storehouses on the wharf. The tort was not complete within navigable water jurisdiction.
However, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964) overruled Plymouth since it extended admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction to damage or injury consummated or done on land to persons
or property when caused by a vessel on navigable water.
5. See Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914), where a stevedore
was injured by a falling hatch cover while unloading copper on a ship. In this specific
instance, the "wrong which was the subject of the suit was . . . of a maritime nature."
Id. at 61; Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co., 125 F. 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1903), where
libellant-stevedore was injured while unloading cargo in the hold of a vessel. Admiralty
jurisdiction was denied since the court held there was no maritime relation; Davis v. City
of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965), where respondent surfboard
rider struck libellant while he was swimming in the ocean. The district court found the
action to be within admiralty jurisdiction and added that "[e]ven if some maritime
connection other than locality is required to sustain jurisdiction . . . it exists in this
case." Id. at 328.
6. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), a stevedore was fatally
injured while unloading cargo on a steamship. The Court found that both the stevedore's
work and his contract were maritime and thus within admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 217.
Accord. Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917).
7. In McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), libellant
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area that the Smith problem was resolved in favor of denial of
jurisdiction.
The purpose of federal jurisdiction in admiralty and
maritime cases is the maintenance of uniformity and consistency
in the field.' However, judicial use of the locality rule to reach

the desired uniformity and consistency has been met with sharp
criticism by text and law review writers. Smith recognizes the

problem of lack of uniformity in the area of maritime law and
its holding that there must be a maritime connection in order for
admiralty to entertain a tort claim is an attempt to eliminate the
above inconsistencies.'" However, this problem may be insoluble.
This insolubility is due to the intrinsic nature of maritime

and admiralty jurisdiction under both the federal jurisdictional
statute and other applicable federal statutes. The United States
Constitution provides that the jurisdictional power of the United
States shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."" The general admiralty jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. section 1333, provides in part that:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction
exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled.

A party, under the first part of the statute ("Any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction"), may establish the requisite
admiralty jurisdiction through the locality rule.'2 While the
statute recognizes that federal courts have original jurisdiction,
was injured by a protruding object in the ocean off Staten Island. The district court
stated the locality rule and held it was a rule of limitation. Since the libel did not relate
to any tort growing out of navigation, it was held that the courts in the locality should
determine the question. Id. at 871. Accord, Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms,
385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967), where libellant injured himself when he dove off a pier into
18 inches of water. Jurisdiction was denied.
8. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874); accord, Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
9. See Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases of Tort, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
8-9 (1909); 25 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1912); Hough, Admiraly Jurisdiction-oj Late
Years, 37 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1924); C. Black, Jr., Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and
Suggestions, 50 COLUm. L. REv. 259 (1950); but see 16 HARv. L. REv. 210 (1903), where
there was doubt expressed as to the holding that a maritime connection exists.
10. 290 F. Supp. I1I, 113 (1968).
II. U.S. CONST. art. 11l, § 2.
12. C. Black, Jr., supra note 9, at 266.
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the "savings" clause places a limit upon it. This clause has been
interpreted to mean a suitor (or libellant), in addition to an
action before an admiralty court, may enforce any maritime in

personam13 claim by civil action in a state court, or in federal
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship."
If a party desires a jury trial and lacks diversity he may

pursue a remedy in the state court. 15 While the forum is different,
the federal substantive maritime rules as to comparative

negligence, assumption of risk, burden of proof, etc., control in
all three courts. 6 The doctrine of comparative negligence is

applied 7 while contributory negligence does not bar recovery.18
The defense of assumption of risk 9 and statute of limitations,"
are not available to the respondent. However, although

2
respondent loses his right to contribution between tortfeasors, 1

he may seek a petition for limitation of liability 2 Admiralty has

established no statutory standard of care in tort actions2 3 and
review of lower court decisions is limited. 24 Despite the
13. Admiralty courts may hear both in personani and in ren claims. In personani
claims may, where jurisdiction over the defendant is obtained, be brought in either
common law or admiralty. Therefore, in personam jurisdiction is concurrent. However, in
ren jurisdiction, where a lien may be enforced against the res (usually a ship), is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty court. I E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN
ADMIRALTY §§ 22-23 (6th ed. A. Knauth 1940). As far as in personani claims are
concerned, "exclusivity is totally illusory." C. Black, Jr., supra note 9, at 265.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY I13 (1957). This is assuming diversity of citizenship. There are two circuits which have
held that without diversity the federal district court did not have jurisdiction even though
the subject was a maritime tort. Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221
F.2d 615, 619 (2d Cir. 1955); Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1950). The
Supreme Court has upheld this position in Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-80 (1959).
15. M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 81 (2d ed. 1966).
However, under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1964), a trial by jury is allowed where either
party demands it and the tort or contract matter occurs upon lakes or navigable waters
connecting lakes.
16. M. NORRIS, supra note 15, at § 80.
17. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 629 (1959).
18. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 14 (1890).
19. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 429 (1939); Bow v. Pilato, 82
F. Supp. 399, 402 (1949).
20. The doctrine of laches may be applied to determine if an action is barred.
Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1951).
21. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285
(1952).
22. Butler v. Boston and Savanna S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 552 (1889).
23. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31
(1959).
24. While an admiralty suit is tried de novo on appeal, the lower court findings will
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availability of these different judicial forums, the substantive
rights of the federal admiralty courts similarly are applied in
25
order to achieve the desired uniformity.
The ability to apply the same rules in each forum would
allow some uniformity and consistency but for the fact that the
"savings" clause is also considered to give to the state courts
concurrent jurisdiction with admiralty in cases where the original
state court is competent to give a remedy.26 The Smith court
recognized the traditional concurrent jurisdiction of the state
courts applying state law, but did not seem to see that the
"savings" clause could produce contradictory results between
27
state and admiralty courts.
The Smith court did hold, however, that section 1333 should
be construed strictly since it was not the exclusive basis for
admiralty jurisdiction.28 Admiralty jurisdiction has been
expanded by such federal statutes as the Extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act,2. 9 the Death on the High Seas Act,." nd the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act." Judge Noel, in
Smith, did not mention the locality rule as being applied to the
latter two acts, but there have been cases under those acts which
have been decided after finding jurisdiction under the locality
rule.
Thus, if the maritime connection rule articulated in Smith is
accepted, there may be doubts as to its applicability under both
the Death on the High Seas Act, and the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act. While the Death on the High Seas Act
does not specifically mention tort claims for wrongful death
caused by airplane crashes in navigable waters beyond the one
marine league limit,32 such claims, with one exception,33 have
been held to be within exclusive admiralty jurisdiction 4
be accepted, unless clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Kulack v. The Pearl
Jack, 178 F.2d 154, 155 (6th Cir. 1949).
25. Oroz v. American PreSident Lines, Ltd., 259 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1958).
26. M. NORRIS, supra note 15, § 84 at 209.
27. 290 F. Supp. at 113.

28. Id.
29.
30.
31.
32.

46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1964).
33 U.S.C. § 901 etseq. (1964).
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964) provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore
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In Wilson v. Transocean Airlines,35 an airplane bound for
Oakland crashed into the Pacific Ocean 325 miles from Wake
Island. Pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act, the district
court found the requisite admiralty jurisdiction, holding that the
locality of the tort controls the question of whether the action
may be brought into admiralty 6 The admiralty court, in Lavello
v. Danko 3 7 allowed a libel which alleged that the tortious
conduct occurred other than on the high seas, even though the
impact of the tortious conduct took place over the high seasY5
Also, in Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,9 a district court has
found admiralty jurisdiction within one marine league of shore.
That court, analogizing to the Death on the High Seas Act
cases, decided that under the locality rule an admiralty court
could apply state law.40
Therefore, it may be argued that if the Smith maritime
connection test were applied to wrongful death actions arising
out of an airplane crash beyond or within one marine league,

such cases may not come within admiralty jurisdiction. This is
so because the strict locality rule was used to establish admiralty
jurisdiction in Wilson, Lavello, and Weinstein. It may initially
of any State . . .the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a
suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in
admiralty ....
33. In Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 258, 176 N.E.2d 820 (1961), the
New York Court of Appeals held in a one page opinion that jurisdiction under the Death
on the High Seas Act was concurrent and a state court could use state procedural rules
to enforce substantive rights under the federal act.
34. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 92-93 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
35. 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
36. Id. at 93. The court stated that "the tort is deemed to occur, not where the
wrongful act or omission has its inception, but where the impact of the act or omission
produces such injury as to give rise to a cause of action." Id. at 92. Accord, Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Monterey, 6 F.2d 893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1925); Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916, 918 (D. Mass. 1951); Thomson v. Bassett, 36 F.
Supp. 956, 957 (W.D.Mich. 1940).
37. 175 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
38. Id. at 93.
39. 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
40. Id. at 763-65. The court reasoned that:
[i]f, as it has been held, a tort claim arising out of the crash of an airplane
beyond the one marine league line is within the jurisdiction of admiralty, then
a Jortiori a crash of an aircraft just short of that line but still within the
navigable waters is within that jurisdiction as well. To hold otherwise would
be to impose an illogical and irrational distinction on the operation of the
broad grant of admiralty jurisdiction extended by the Constitution and
implemented by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333.
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appear that, under the Smith rule, there would be little maritime
connection between an airplane flight and admiralty. Such a suit
can be brought on the civil side of the federal district court with
little fear of losing any uniformity and consistency of laws. The
Smith rule may hold, in a future action with facts similar to
Wilson, that such a crash is "only incidentally related to
navigable waters and wholly unconnected with maritime
commerce ..... , However, there is some dicta in the cases
which reveal a judicial understanding that a maritime relation
could be found, since airplanes, by their very nature, have to fly
over seas and are performing essentially the same tasks as
2

vessels.1

There also may be problems applying the maritime
connection rule under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.' 3 This Act deals with compensation for
injuries to employees who perform services of the type performed
by longshoremen and harbor workers as contrasted with
employees (crewmen) who are naturally and primarily aboard
ship to aid in a vessel's navigation. 4i While these employees are
not classed as seamen in the sense of members of the crew of a
41 290 F. Supp. at 113. See 316 F.2d at 763, where the court reasoned that:
aircraft have become a major instrument of travel and commerce over and
across the same waters. When an aircraft crashes into navigable waters, the
dangers to persons and property are much the same as those arising out or
the sinking of a ship or a collision between two vessels.
42. In discussing the purpose of the Death on the High Seas Act, the court in
D'Aleaman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1958) stated
that:
When the Act was passed (March 30, 1920) the only feasible way to be
carried beyond the jurisdiction of any law applicable to wrongful death was
by ship. However, with the development of the transoceanic airship the same
extraterritorial situation was made possible in the air. The Act was designed
to create a cause of action in an area not theretofore under the jurisdiction of
any court. The means of transportation into the area is of no importance.
The statutory expression -on the high seas" should be capable of expansion
to, under, or, over, as scientific advances change the methods of travel. The
law would indeed be static if a passenger on a ship were protected by the Act
and another passenger in the identical location three thousand feet above in a
plane were not.
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 eiseq.; section 903(a) provides that:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability
or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an
injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States . . . and if
recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.
44. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 260 (1940).
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vessel," they have been allowed to file libels in admiralty!' Since
the Longshoremen's Act "relates solely to injuries occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States, it deals with
the maritime law, applicable to matters that fall within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." '7
In Caldaro v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,"s a freight
handler employed by a railroad company was injured on a gang
plank connecting a pier with a steel car float in navigable waters.
The district court, in finding admiralty jurisdiction, stated that
the phrase "upon the navigable water" in the Longshoremen's
Act is the same phrase as used to determine admiralty
jurisdiction by means of the locality test 9
In Interlake Steamship Co. v. Nielsen, 0 decedent ship
custodian drove his car off the end of a dock where his ship was
berthed. He died of a skull fracture caused when his car hit the
frozen waters of Lake Erie. It was held that since the situs of the
injury and the death occurred on the frozen navigable waters
admiralty could take jurisdiction under the Longshoremen's
Act.5
Assuming the locality rule is discarded, there is doubt that
the Smith court would find a maritime connection between a
railroad worker injuring himself on a plank, or between a ship's
custodian driving off a pier, and maritime commerce. Thus,
under the locality rule, the tort is within maritime jurisdiction,
while under Smith's maritime connection rule, it may be
without. Smith could easily find that such actions are "wholly
unconnected with maritime commerce [and] can be litigated in
state courts under the diverse rules of state law without affecting

maritime endeavors.'

'52

45. Id. at 260.
46. Id. at 256.
47. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39 (1932).
48. 166 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
49. Id. at 836; see also Richards v. Monahan, 17 F. Supp. 252, 253 (D. Mass. 1936)
and Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933), where the circuit court said
"'where the negligent act originates on land and the damage occurs on water, the cause of
action is within the admiralty jurisdiction."
50. 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964).
5 1. Id. at 883; see also Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 33 F.R.D. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
Monterey, 6 F.2d 893 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
52. 290 F. Supp. at 113.
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The acceptance of the Smith maritime connection rule
would, in essence, be the adoption of the same rule used to
determine jurisdiction in maritime contract actions; i.e., the
subject matter of the contract (its maritime nature and
I 3 The Smith court states that to require a
character) controls.
"maritime connection in all tort cases would complement . . .
[current] trends by making the jurisdictional issue simpler to
resolve and by making the resolution less arbitrary."'" This may
be a doubtful result since maritime jurisdiction has, for example,
in contract actions been: (1) admitted for the weighing,
inspecting and measure of cargo, 55 but denied for storing cargo
in a vessel after a voyage;" (2) allowed for a suit under an
insurance policy 5 ' but denied on a contract to obtain insurance
for a vessel;" (3) allowed for suit on a contract to act as seamen
for fishing and canning, 9 but denied on a contract by a broker
to furnish fourteen crew members for a merchant ship.'" By
attempting to eliminate the arbitrariness of the locality rule, the
maritime connection rule, as set forth in Smith, may be exposed
to the same criticism that has been leveled at the maritime
contract rule, that it has "about as much 'principle' as there is
in a list of irregular verbs."'"
To go from one confusion to another may not necessarily be
disadvantageous; this is so because the same rule would be used
to determine both contract and tort claims. Smith and Weinstein
are illustrative of the problem that the maritime connection rule
would obviate. In Smith, the forklift was damaged when it
struck the water, while the crane was damaged when the boom
collapsed. The accident with the forklift was governed by the
strict locality rule for jurisdiction while the crane accident was
not. However, under the maritime connection test, libellant53. 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 62 (6th ed. A. Knauth
1940).
54. 290 F. Supp. at 114.
55. Constantine v. The Schooner River Queen, 2 F. 731, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1880),
56. The Richard Winslow, 67 F. 259, 261 (E.D. Wis. 1895), afjfd 71 F. 426 (7th
Cir. 1896).
57. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 30-33 (1870).
58. Warner v. The Bear, 126 F. Supp. 529, 530 (D.C. Alas. 1955).
59. Domenico v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 112 F. 554, 556 (N.D. Cal. 1901).
60. Goumas v. K. Karras & Son, 140 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1944).
61. 50 COLUI. L. REV. at 264. For an illustrative collection of maritime contract
versus non-maritime contract cases, see I E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY
§§ 66-67 (6th ed. A. Knauth 1940).
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Smith would have to succeed in alleging a maritime connection
for both the libel and the cross-complaint in order to bring a suit
in admiralty. If he failed on one action (respondent-Guerrant's
cross-complaint for crane damage) his own libel for water
damage would fail. He would have failed to prove a true
maritime connection since both claims have to be wholly related
to maritime commerce. Also, in Weinstein, the tort claims
arising out of the airplane crash, were within admiralty while
actions for breach of warranty were not6 2 In Weinstein, a failure
to prove a maritime connection in both tort and contract claims
would deny the libellant admiralty jurisdiction (assuming he
63
wished to raise both at the same time)
A final test for the maritime connection rule as
determinative of admiralty jurisdiction, would be acceptance by
the United States Supreme Court 4 With Smith, a conflict has
emerged between federal district courts with respect to
determining maritime jurisdiction. As noted above, due to the
inherent ambiguity of the "savings" clause in section 1333 and
the federal acts which occupy part of the maritime field, the
much sought-after uniformity and consistency has not yet been
achieved. The acceptance of the maritime connection rule by the
Supreme Court might be a step in the right direction.
The issues presented by the Smith case are very narrow;
which rule, locality or connection, should be used to establish
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction? One real problem which will
continue beyond the ultimate resolution of that issue is the
difficulty in defining specifically what a maritime connection is
and applying that definition to sundry fact situations, so that
uniformity and consistency result.
62. 316 F.2d at 766.
63. This would create an anomolous situation. The district court in Weinstein would
have to find a maritime connection in the breach of warranty causes of action where
previously such actions were held to be not within admiralty jurisdiction. 316 F.2d at
766. In Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1962) arising from an air-

plane crash, an action for breach of an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability
under the Death on the High Seas Act did not lie since it was not provided for in the Act. Id.
at 940; noted in 48 'VA. L. REV. 1467 (1962).
64. In Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914), the Court stated

that:
[tihe appropriate basis, it is said, of all admiralty jurisdiction, whether in
contract or in tort, is the maritime nature of the transaction or event . ...

We do not find it necessary to enter upon this broad inquiry.
Id. at 61. Accord, as to the first point, The Raithmoor, 241 U.S. 166, 176 (1916)
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But these narrow issues are only indicative of a much
broader problem underlying this entire area: that is, the validity
of maintaining concurrent maritime jurisdiction between state
and federal courts. Although an extended discussion of that issue
is beyond the scope of this note, some brief remarks are
appropriate.
In view of the foregoing problems, the questions arise
whether, in fact, there is a need for maritime jurisdiction, and
more importantly, a need for concurrent state and federal court
jurisdiction to adjudicate admiralty claims.
While it is true that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is
specifically provided for in the Constitution under article III,
section 2, there is no mention that admiralty should have a
special set of jurisdictional and substantive rules. The only
reason that can be found is historical. Arising out of the exercise
-of customary sea law, maritime courts in English port towns by
the fifteenth century were annexed to the Lord High Adriiral's
Office. The common law courts resented the fact that the
Admiralty Office had acquired jurisdiction over civil cases of a
maritime nature. Due to this resentment, the jurisdiction of the
Admiralty court was limited by statute to "a thing done upon
the sea." 6 5
It is from this background that the colonies inherited
jurisdiction to decide maritime cases and subsequently included
admiralty and maritime cases within the federal purview under
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,66 now codified as section 1333
of Title 28 U.S.C. As has been mentioned, the "savings" clause
does not make admiralty jurisdiction federally exclusive since it
allows admiralty courts to apply state laws when no federal
statute applies, and when it is found that a tort was maritime
but local.6 7 This casts doubt on the desire to maintain
"uniformity and consistency." If uniformity and consistency in
the administration of admiralty jurisdiction is truly sought, then
perhaps the "savings" clause should be eliminated from section
1333. Thus, there would be no problem concerning the court in
65. G.

GILMORE AND

C.

BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY

8-10 (1957).

66. Id. at 18.
67. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1955);
Westcrn Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
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which one may pursue a remedy. A suggested new rule would be:
any tort which occurred on navigable waters, or, had a maritime
connection, shall be brought within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal district courts.
Unfortunately, enacting exclusive federal admiralty
jurisdiction will not solve the problem of determining whether
there is in fact a maritime connection. The Smith court merely
states that a tort claim should be wholly related to maritime
service, to navigation, and to commerce on navigable waters. It
is not clear whether these three criteria should be viewed jointly
or separately. However, it seems that it would be unreasonable to
view them jointly, and therefore if any one of the three satisfied
the test of substantial maritime connection, then admiralty
jurisdiction would follow. But this may not be sufficient in
defining the connection rule. Reference should be made to the
varying fact patterns in which the maritime connection rule was
applied in contract actions.
PHILIP A. DEMASSA

